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Oil, Development, and the Politics
of the Bottom Billion1
Michael Watts
The secret of great wealth with no obvious source is some
forgotten crime, forgotten because it was done neatly.
Honoré de Balzac
[R]egions at the epicenter of oil production are torn apart by
repeated conflicts.
Achille Mbembe (2001)

T

he Economist of 4 August 2007 called it a “slip of a book” and “set
to become a classic.” Paul Collier’s The Bottom Billion argues that most
of the bottom billion, the world’s chronically poor, live in 58 countries
(almost three quarters of which are African) distinguished by their
lack of economic growth and the prevalence of civil conflict. Most
are caught in a quartet of “traps,” two of which (in Collier’s account
they are deeply related) concern me here: the civil war trap (the average cost of a typical civil war is about $64 billion) in which 73% of the
poor have been caught at one time or another; and a natural-resource
trap (resource wealth or dependency turned sour), which accounts
for another 30%.2 Collier’s argument is not simply that civil conflict
is expensive in human and developmental terms nor that wars are
associated with economic stagnation and poverty (“low income means
poverty, and low growth means hopelessness. Young men, who are
recruits for rebel armies, come pretty cheap…Life itself is cheap”3).
Rather, he sees this nexus of forces as arising from resource dependency (“Dependence upon primary commodity exports…substantially
increases the risk of civil war”4). That is to say, there is a robust relationship between resource wealth and, paradoxically, poor economic
performance, poor governance (resource predation), and the likelihood of falling into (debilitating and enduring) civil conflicts. Collier’s
book speaks to a wider interest taken by economists and political scientists in what seems like a challenge to economic orthodoxy, namely,
that resource wealth (as a source of comparative advantage) turns out
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to be a “curse.”5 The “resource-curse” literature—whether emphasizing poor economic performance, state failure (oil breeds corruption
or “resource rents make democracy malfunction”6), or the onset of
civil violence (blood diamonds, oil secession)—has generated a vast
amount of research of which Collier and his colleagues have been central contributors.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Nigeria figures centrally in Collier’s book.
An oil state gone awfully wrong, a black hole for foreign aid ($280 billion in 30 years with “depressingly little to show for it”), endemic (perhaps Olympian) corruption and rent seeking, mass miscomprehension
or false consciousness (the popular Nigerian belief that the poverty
of the 1980s was a function of structural adjustment rather than the
massive mismanagement of the oil boom-bust cycle), and a litany of
military governments interspersed with periods of civilian rule which
confirm his claim that “resource-rich democracies” and an abundance
of oil rents alters how electoral competition is conducted (“it lets in
the politics of patronage”7). Big Oil engenders Big Patronage (“the law
of the political jungle: the survival of the fattest”8). Oil wealth relaxes
political constraints, most obviously by obviating the need to tax. The
sort of democracy that resource-rich states engender is “dysfunctional
for economic development,” especially if they are low income and ethnically diverse. To round out the story, the combustible mix of the law
of the survival of the fattest under the dispensation of oil provides ideal
grounds for resource predation and the illicit economy of rebellion (the
economic basis of civil war). Nigeria and its oil-producing Niger Delta
is a textbook case of why rebellions have much less to do with what
rebel leaders say about their political project (liberation, justice, equity)
and much more to do with organized crime and the readiness with
which the resource upon which the fattest depend can be looted.
[I]f low income and slow growth make a country prone to civil war…
why[?]… . low income means poverty, and low growth means hopelessness. Young men, who are the recruits for rebel armies, come pretty
cheap… . Life is cheap and joining a rebel movement gives these young men a
small chance of riches… . [People in the Niger Delta] with a sense of grievance were no more likely to take part in violent protest than those who
were not aggrieved. So what did make people more likely to engage
in political violence?…well, being young, being uneducated, and being
without dependents… . [There] was no relationship between social amenities that a district possessed and its propensity to political violence.
Instead the violence occurs in the districts with oil wells… . [A]lthough
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the risk of violence jumps sharply if there is at least one oil well, if there
are two oil wells in the district it starts to go down. And with twenty oil
wells it is lower still…To my mind this looks more like a protection racket than
outrage provoked by environmental damage. In the absence of an oil well
there is no scope for extortion and so no violent protest. With an oil well
the protection racket is in business. But the more oil wells…the greater
the incentive for an oil company to pay up and buy peace. …[O]ver time
the situation has evolved. There is now a huge amount of money being
directed by the Nigerian federal government to the delta region and the
oil companies are desperately paying protection money…Within the
region local politicians are fighting it out for control of all this money
and violent protest has become an orchestrated part of the political
rent seeking. Grievance has evolved, over the course of a decade, into greed.9
(emphasis added)

Oil democracy, says Collier, is an oxymoron. In this rendering, oil
accounts for a delusional body politic, psychopathic criminals dressed
as freedom fighters, state institutions resembling those of Albanian
socialism, and rafts of Big Man patrons armed with real estate in Nice
and offshore accounts in the Cayman Islands. Furthermore, it ensures
a descent into civil conflict that is likely to last seven years and make
people 15% poorer. Albanian socialism, in fact, looks pretty good by
comparison.
There is the ring of truth here. Oil wealth can be, and often is, ill
managed. Oil-producing states are among the most corrupt and venal
anywhere. The world of oil rents is one of spectacular consumption
pushed to its limits. But the language of curse invokes a merciless force
for adversity, a sort of commodity determinism vesting oil with capabilities it can neither possess nor dispense. The danger is that the curse
substitutes the commodity for the larger truths of capitalism, markets,
and politics. Is Nigeria cursed by oil or corruption (or corporate capitalism); by petroleum or politics (or ethnicity)?
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I. Globalization, Resource Development, and Oil
Oil is fluid and fugitive.
A petro-geologist, cited in Variant 28 (2007)
Oil is a fungible global commodity
Oil Shockwave, Robert Gates et al. (2005)
Oil is arguably one of the most global and strategic commodities within
the “capitalist cosmos,” as Max Weber called the modern world of commodity production. In fact, it is the very basis of development as we
know it. Oil, in this regard, sheds light on two key concepts: globalization and development. Much has been written about both phenomena.
For the purposes of this essay, oil as an emblem of globalization refers
simultaneously to the fact of a worldwide global market (for oil and
gas), the organization of its commodity chain (from production to consumption) characterized by “overcoming the friction of distance” (that
is to say, complex forms of social relations stretched over time reflected
in transnational interdependencies), and complex transnational flows
of capital. The lineaments of global oil are clear. The global oil and gas
infrastructure—the material basis of the oil and gas supply, otherwise
known as the global value-chain—is nothing short of gargantuan. To
say that the value of the industry now totals over $4,000 billion says
everything and nothing. Close to one million producing oil wells puncture the surface of the earth (77,000 were drilled in 2007, with 4,000 offshore; 3,300 are sub-sea). More than two million kilometers of pipeline
blanket the globe in a massive trunk-network: 75,000 km move oil and
gas along the sea floor. Another 156,000 km of pipeline is anticipated to
be completed between 2008 and 2012. There are 6,000 fixed platforms
and 635 offshore drilling rigs (the international rig total for March 2008
is 3,259, according to Baker Hughes). In 2007, $68 billion was spent
on offshore drilling. In addition, 4295 oil tankers (vessels greater than
1,000 long tons or more deadweight) move 2.42 billion tons of oil and
oil products per year, 34% of global seaborne trade. There are 717 refineries that process crude oil. More than 80 massive floating, production,
and storage vessels have been installed in the last five years.
Deepwater exploration is the very embodiment of the global urge,
the ceaseless territorial imperative to locate new fields, with deepwater offshore expected to grow by 78% between 2007 and 2011. On
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2 August 2007, a Russian submarine with two parliamentarians on
board planted a titanium flag two miles down under the North Pole.
At stake were the lucrative new oil and gas fields (by some estimates
10 billion tons of oil equivalent) on the Artic sea floor. Two weeks later,
it was announced that the Northwest Passage was navigable, facilitating the opening of a new oil frontier, the ecological precondition of
which—global warming—was the product of Big Oil. Environmental
crisis (the second contradiction of capital) creates the conditions for
another round of capitalist investment and a new and spectacular capitalist frontier—in short, recursive primitive accumulation. Sub-zero
temperatures and almost year-round darkness presented no obstacles
to the purveyors of oil. In late 2006, a consortium of companies discovered oil at a staggering depth, 150 miles into the Gulf of Mexico. The
test well, Jack-2, delves through 7,000 feet of water and 20,000 feet of
sea floor to tap oil in tertiary rock laid down 60 million years ago. The
drill ships and production platforms required for such an undertaking
are massive floating structures, much larger than the biggest aircraft
carriers, and more expensive, costing well over a half-billion dollars
(and close to a million dollars a day) to rent. In 2007, the vast new Tupi
field in Brazilian coastal waters was discovered in 200 meters of water
below a massive layer of salt in hugely inhospitable geological conditions. One test well cost over $250 million. In short, what is on offer is
a deepwater land grab. Primitive accumulation and globalization at
7,000 meters!
None of this is to suggest that globalization produces a frictionless
world of homogenous space. Quite the contrary. Globalized oil and gas
reveals precisely how global forces are always localized in place- or
region-specific “oil complexes.”10
As a global commodity central to the development project of oil and
non-oil producers alike, we must take seriously the Janus-faced properties of any commodity: it is a particular unity of use and exchange
values, and at the same moment, an object of mystification and
fetishization. As Fernando Coronil put it in The Magical State, “oil illustrates…the mystification of natural resources in the modern world.”11
To this extent, we should be careful not to be seduced by the fetishism
of oil or invest in it powers that it does not deserve. It is important to
carefully specify the complex traffic between petroleum and economics or politics in order to be able to chart the contours of the work
that oil is doing for us in talking about petro-states or oil politics.
Ryszard Kapuscinski, the brilliant Polish journalist (recently deceased),
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noted that, “oil is a fairy tale…and like all fairy tales a bit of a lie.”12
Oil is a natural resource and a commodity, perhaps the mother of all
commodities. It happens to be the fuel of our modern, turbo-charged,
hydrocarbon capitalism and an item of exchange capable of yielding
unimaginable wealth, or “Black Gold.” In the long march toward the
modern world-system, mass commodities of various sorts—sugar, silver, slaves, palm oil, petroleum—have been its beasts of burden. They
have come to serve not only as markers for entire epochs—the Era of
Slavery, the Age of Oil—but to enter the world market bearing the hallmark of what Hannah Arendt once called, “the original sin of primitive
accumulation,”13 dripping with blood and dirt. Mass commodities,
with their blood and dirt still attached, have always provided Nigeria’s
and the Niger Delta’s entry point into the world economy, its calling
card to the capitalist cosmos.
If the commodity is what Karl Marx called the economic cell form
of capital, then oil is a perfect expression of contemporary capitalism’s
most basic genetic material. Oil’s power as a commodity in the market
derives from its two-fold identity. It comes first with its usefulness,
its expediency, and then with its price tag. Both seem straightforward
and unambiguous. Yet the pricing of oil is mysterious and bewildering, part of a world of appearances that obscures the operations of the
system of which oil is part. Walter Benjamin, the great German critic,
said that the commodity has a phantom-like objectivity. Commodities
are not what they seem and for this reason are subject to all manner
of mystification; they come with their own aura. Ryszard Kapuscinski was witness to the spectacular oil boom in West Asia during the
1970s. In his book Shah of Shahs, he says oil “is a filthy, foul-smelling
liquid that squirts obligingly up into the air and falls back to earth as a
rustling shower of money.” It is a resource that “anesthetizes thought,
blurs vision, corrupts…[it] kindles extraordinary emotions and hopes,
since oil is above all a great temptation.”14 Oil has always been vested
with enormous, often magical, powers. Sometimes I think we are too
easily seduced by these deceits.
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that oil of all resources has been
invested with almost Olympian transformative powers. Oil distorts the
organic, natural course of development. Oil wealth ushers in an economy of hyper-consumption and spectacular excess: bloated shopping
malls in Dubai and corrupt Russian “oilygarchs.” There is even a psychological appellation to describe the condition: the Gillette Syndrome.
El Dean Kohrs studied the booming coal town of Gillette, Wyoming, in
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the 1970s, and was witness to how a commodity boom brought a corresponding wave of crime, drugs, violence, and inflation. It would afflict
new gas fields in Wyoming, indigenous oil communities in Ecuador,
and the rough-and-tumble Russian oil fields of Siberia. Other scholars,
like Michael Ross, argue that, “oil hinders democracy” (as if copper
might promote constitutionalism). Oil revenues permit low taxes and
encourage patronage, thereby dampening pressures for democracy. It
endorses despotic rule through bloated militaries and creates a class
of state-dependents employed in the modern industrial and service
sectors, who are less likely to push for democracy.15 New York Times
columnist and world-class autodidact Thomas Friedmann has even
identified a “First Law of Petropolitics”: the higher the average global
crude price of oil, the more free speech, free press, fair elections, an
independent judiciary, the rule of law, and independent political parties are eroded. Hugo Chavez is, of course, the law’s most devious
exponent. In sum, the oil world is cursed—a “carbontocracy”—impoverished by its wealth.
I wish to take on three aspects of this variegated body of work as
a way of opening up a larger argument about how to understand the
dynamics of oil states, and specifically the relationship between oil,
politics, and forms of rule. The first I shall call “rebellion as crime.” It
speaks to the work of Paul Collier (and Michael Ross) and his World
Bank comrades who address the economics of civil war. They offer
an argument that oil provides a ground on which rebels can finance
a self-interested and criminal movement against the state through the
looting of oil resources.
The second, which I shall call “the territoriality/materiality claim,”
is associated with a body of largely geographical work. I shall use
Philippe Le Billon’s important research disseminated in 2005, which
turns on the fact that oil has a specific materiality and a territoriality
that shapes particular sorts of political outcomes, for example, coups
or secessions.
The third, “the predation claim,” examines the idea of an oil insurgency or an oil rebellion rooted in the claim that the “lootability” of oil
is central to grasping the character of the insurgency itself.16
In exploring (and departing from) these ideas, I want to provide a
rather different analysis and shed some light on Mbembe’s question
that opens the essay: why is oil so frequently the epicenter of violence?
I also suggest that in states in which oil is a national resource (established through statutory monopolies) and a territorial (i.e., place or
regionally based) commodity, the centralization of oil revenues through
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the state joint venture (I am using this term to cover a variety of legalinstitutional arrangements from production share agreements to service contracts) provides a terrain on which we can explore Foucault’s
claim that government is concerned with “men in their relations, their
links, their imbrications with those things that are wealth, resources,
means of subsistence… . [and] territory with its specific qualities.”17 In
short, I want to explore the new governable spaces18 that emerge from
“the oil complex.” They are violent and unstable, suggestive of a sort
of political splintering and fragmentation. They seem to indicate that
oil politics, including oil insurgency and the rebellion across the Niger
Delta oil fields, works through complex forms of dispossession. What
is on offer, then, is a recursive form of primitive accumulation (here I
endorse Arendt’s idea of the essential repetition of the “original sin of
robbery”) in which oil and violent rule are inextricably linked.
II. The Smash-and-Grab for African Oil
Among Washington’s chattering classes there is a deep concern, bordering on panic, with the growing Chinese presence—diplomatic, economic, and political—on the African continent. Driven in large measure
by China’s aggressive expansion into the energy sector, “Sino-power”
has been cast as part of a new “scramble for oil” against a backdrop
of tight global oil markets and a post-9/11 U.S. obsession with energy
security (in effect, a dovetailing of the Global War on Terror with the
2001 Cheney Report’s trepidation over Middle East oil dependency.)19
There are those, Frynas and Paulo for example, who argue that the oil
scramble bears no affinity to its late 19th-century counterpart and that
Sino oil power is much exaggerated. Historical parallels notwithstanding, the African oil complex—the dense networks of actors and agents
organized around the exploration and development of oil and gas—is
being refigured by tectonic shifts in the pattern of oil operations.
First, Chinese oil contracts from the three largest oil companies (Sinopec, CNOOC, and CNPC, with a combined market value of $225
billion) have mushroomed from virtually zero in 1995 to seventy contracts in sixteen countries by 2007, covering a total acreage of more
than 8.2 million sq. km.20 Chinese oil operations, predicated upon an
“integrated independent energy and security model,” in short, mercantilism, develop long-term stable agreements linked to large infrastructure and aid projects sustained by China’s massive reserves of
accumulated liquidity now in excess of $1 trillion.21 This is a strategy
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that includes a number of other Asian national oil companies, most
especially KNOC (Korea) and PETRONAS (Malaysia), constructing oil
operations around self-contained mercantilist alliances, typically bi- or
tri-lateral arrangements lubricated by aid, capital, and expertise.
Second, the Gulf of Guinea is a hot new and dynamic supply zone
in the so-called “new Gulf states,” and has emerged as a major supplier to the seemingly insatiable U.S. market. Its obvious geo-strategic advantages—large and accessible reserves of light, sweet crudes,
a large liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector, and proximity to North
American markets—have all contributed to the fact that Nigeria alone
supplies over 12% of total U.S. crude imports.
Not least, there are the twin developments of the new institutional
and financial complexity of oil projects, especially deepwater offshore
production and multi-train liquefied natural gas infrastructures, coupled with what the industry sees as the assertive “petro-nationalism”
of African oil-states and their national oil companies22 (the passing in
2007 of an ambitious new local content law in Nigeria is simply one
case in point).
Whether or not such a dynamic energy sector warrants the term
“scramble,” oil investment is incontestably vast, diversified, and growing (for example, the six-train LNG plant on Bonny Island in Nigeria,
with its attendant gas infrastructure, is already a $12 billion investment). The Cheney energy report highlighted the fact that the region
is driven by a “huge exploration investment,” expected to contribute more than 30% of world liquid hydrocarbon production by 2010.
Over the last five years, when new oil field discoveries have been very
scarce, Africa contributed one in every four barrels of new petroleum
discovered outside of North America. The West African Gulf of Guinea,
encompassing the rich on- and offshore fields stretching from Nigeria
to Angola, represented a key plank in the Bush administration’s alternative to the increasingly volatile and unpredictable oil-states of the
Persian Gulf. Oil investment now represents over 50% of all foreign
direct investment (FDI) in the continent, and more than 60% of all FDI
in the top four FDI recipient countries. Almost 90% of all cross-border
merger and acquisition activity since 2003 has been in the mining and
petroleum sectors.23 Between 1995 and 2001, FDI inflow amounted to
$7 billion per year, but almost two-thirds of the portfolio was destined
for the three countries (Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa) in which oil
FDI accounted for 90% of all FDI inflow. Naturally, the Gulf of Guinea
figures centrally in this new African oil landscape. Within the West
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African oil triangle, Nigeria rules the roost, currently producing 2.4
million barrels per day (bpd) with an ambitious program to expand
output to over 4 million bpd.
Running across this landscape of dynamic energy-capitalism is
a deep vein of political volatility capable of roiling the commodity
exchanges. Nowhere is this volatility more pronounced, and seemingly intractable, than in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, a vast sedimentary
and oil-rich basin of some 70,000 sq. km. and composed officially of
nine states (Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Imo, Cross River,
Ondo, and Edo), 185 local government areas (LGAs), and a population
of roughly 28 million people. To put the matter starkly, the Niger Delta
possesses a massive oil infrastructure—606 fields (40% off shore), 5,284
wells, 7,000 kilometers of pipelines, ten export terminals, 275 flow
stations, ten gas plants, four refineries, and a world class six-train
liquefied natural gas installation on Bonny Island—that is more or
less ungovernable. The ninth largest oil producer in the world, in the
wake of the April 2007 elections (widely seen to be even worse than
the fraudulent electoral process of 2003), is now tottering on the edge
of chaos. Roughly half of the delta’s 3,000 communities have some sort
of oil operations within their jurisdiction and the very presence of oil
has been, almost invariably, a source of tension and conflict. Nigeria
meets its OPEC quota yet currently something like 900,000 barrels per
day are “deferred” (or shut-in) because of attacks on installations and
personnel. Another 100,000 barrels per day are stolen (“bunkered”).
To extend the metaphor, the entire corporate oil sector now resides
pretty much in a bunker of its own, its staff and workers (to the extent
they have not been repatriated or withdrawn from the oil fields) are
shuttled around in military convoys. Collectively, this shut-in amounts
to more than one-third of national output. Apparently this is the cost
that the oil companies must bear for their “social license to operate,” as
they put it. Yet it is not at all clear that the majors have a license at all.
Sources put the figure of trained militants at more than 25,000 strong,
commanding monthly salaries of over 50,000 nairas (N), well above the
wage that can be plausibly commanded by an educated youth in the
formal sector.
The Niger Delta (see Figure 1) has become the home of an oil insurgency.24 Remotely detonated car bombs and highly sophisticated arms
and equipment are the tools of the trade. More than 250 foreign hostages have been abducted in the past fifteen months and close to 1,000
Nigerian workers have been detained or held hostage on facilities.
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Figure 1

Major and often spectacular attacks on both on- and offshore facilities
are endemic and can be perpetrated at will. Unlike during the 1980s
or 1990s, militants are now willing and able to directly confront federal and state security forces. The vast cache of sophisticated arms is
skillfully deployed in an environment (the mangrove creeks running
for hundreds of miles along the Bight of Benin) in which the Nigerian
security forces, to quote the new Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan,
“cannot cope with the situation.”25 According to a World Bank report,
more than 600 people have been killed in the course of these conflicts,
often engagements between militias and the joint military task forces,
since 2000. Pipeline breaks due to vandalism and sabotage have almost
doubled between 1999 and 2004 (from 497 to 895). Product losses due
to pipeline ruptures have grown steadily from 179,000 to 396,000 metric tons over the same period (a figure roughly equal to four supertankers).26 The direct assaults on oil installations and infrastructure
cost the Nigerian government $6.8 billion in revenue loss between 1999
and 2004. In the last three years, that figure has increased dramatically.
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Currently, the conflicts cost Nigeria $60 million per day, roughly $4.4
billion per annum in damages and lost revenue.27 In May 2007, Nigeria
drew upon $2.7 billion from its “domestic excess crude,” a windfall
profits account, to plug revenue shortfalls from oil deferment. President Obasanjo ordered the military, in mid-2006, to adopt a “force for
force” policy in the delta in a vain effort to gain control of the creeks.
In early 2007, the Nigerian navy embarked upon its biggest sea maneuver in two decades, deploying thirteen warships, four helicopters, and
four boats to the Bight of Bonny to test “operational capability.” Yet the
month of May 2007, according to a Norwegian consulting company,
Bergen Risk Solutions, witnessed the largest monthly tally of attacks
since the appearance of a shadowy but militarily well-armed insurgent
group called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND) eighteen months ago.28
Many of the oil-producing communities across the delta are torn
apart by all manner of internal (for example, Nembe or Finima) or
inter-community (Ogoni-Andoni) conflicts or both (Soku-Kula-Oluasiri).29 There has certainly been no period since the first oil boom—
palm oil in the early 19th century—in which the delta has been in such
turmoil, other than the civil war. The conflicts have an organic connection to oil but their genealogies are complex. In some cases, communities fight over land and territorial disputes over oil-bearing lands
(Odiama); in some cases, they are secessional disputes, often of great
historical depth, driven by the prospect of access to oil rents and company cash payments (Okrika) compounded by party politics; in other
instances, youth groups struggle among themselves or with elders
over access to companies (Nembe); and sometimes they are sectional
and communal, as ethnic communities in multi-ethnic settings, rural
and urban, struggle over the establishment of electoral wards or local
government councils to ensure that they too can feed at the oil trough
(Warri). The social forces are at once ethnic, generational, gender, class
(chiefs, politicians), corporate, and, of course, state (military and security). Conflicted communities across the oil fields embody complex
configurations of such forces. The social field of violence in which the
delta is now embroiled is a multi-headed hydra.
According to the 2007 UNDP report, there are currently 120–150
“high risk and active violent conflicts” in the three key oil-producing states. At the heart of these contested communities is the “restive
youth problem,”30 as it is known in local parlance, a tectonic shift in
intergenerational politics in the region that has occurred over the last
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two to three decades, driven by the consequences of structural adjustment and state authoritarianism, and given a huge boost of adrenaline
by the return to civilian rule in 1999. Youth, as a social category of
great historical and cultural depth, provides an idiom in a “gerontocratic” and authoritarian setting in which power, secrecy, and sometimes violence can be harnessed as a sort of counter-movement, built
on the ruins of failed oil development.31 Youth organizations have
multiplied and metastasized. They often refigure cultural traditional
institutions like the egbesu, agaba, or mutual support club.32 Since the
1980s they have directly attempted to capture organs of community
power (for example, Community Development Committees), but also
to directly challenge gerontocratic rule. Not least, they have adopted
an increasingly militant stance, acting as the erstwhile liberators—vanguard movements, in effect—for the oppressed of the region. As Gore
and Pratten properly express it, youth represent “shadow structures.”
They are:
covert and secret forms of organization…salient to the practices of everyday life. As a basis for access to resources and the distribution of power,
these modes of collective youth action are generated at the intersecting and interfacing of top-down modes of governance and bottom-up
responses to disorder…expressed as counter-movements against marginalization and coercion.33

The social field of youth violence is as complex as it is variegated,
a diversity captured in the breadth of the local lexicon itself (militias,
“area boys,” vigilantes, gangs, cults, secret societies).34 One of the challenges of any analysis of youth militancy in the delta is precisely to
understand the shifting alliances and networks that link sometimes
shadowy and subterranean groups of rather different provenance and
politics.35 But the well of youth rage (there is no other way to put it) is
deep and has shown itself capable of hewing a very rough-and-tumble
political (dis)order. A large survey of Niger Delta oil communities by
Oyefusi in 2007 discovered that 5% of the population felt satisfied with
the status quo while an astonishing 36.23% revealed a “willingness or
propensity to take up arms against the state.”36 More generally, survey
data shows clearly that many of the youth grievances—poverty, lack
of employment, minimal educational opportunities—are felt widely
across the region, beyond a generation who would identify as militants.37 A far greater proportion of deltans perceive economic neglect
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(“marginalization,” in local parlance) than other regions in the federation and more than 50% of all respondents identify governance as the
fundamental problem working against their opportunity to benefit
from oil.38
It is really an extraordinary train wreck and it represents not just
the conversion of the delta into what Ikelegbe calls “a region of insurrection,”39 but a radical shift from the days of Saro-Wiwa’s nonviolent
struggle of the late 1980s and early 1990s to outright insurgency.40 In
some respects, the current crisis confirms Ken Saro-Wiwa’s prescient
and bleak prediction in 1990 about the “coming war” in the delta: “the
people must be allowed to join in the lucrative sale of oil,” he said, to
avoid “the cataclysm that is building up.”41 Small arms and light weapons are now endemic in the delta and the “pace of acquisition and the
lethality of weapons is increasing.”42 Chief Philip Asiodu’s confident
claim two decades ago that the oil-producing communities “cannot
threaten the stability of the country nor affect its continued economic
development”43 now seems naïve or delusional. The Oputa Commission (the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission), sitting
in Port Harcourt in February 2001, focused much of its attention on
the Niger Delta and concluded, in the words of its Chairman, Chukwudifu Oputa, that the situation was political dynamite.44 With the
emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND) in late 2005, the dynamite had exploded. MEND’s spokesperson referred to a “malignant growth” spreading violently and fast
becoming “Nigeria’s Vietnam.”45 The mix of violence, corruption, and
theft has reached a tipping point. Managing Director of Chevron, Jay
Prior, cryptically observed that, “I have run companies that have had
less production than is being bunkered in this country.”46 How has it
come to this? Does it all amount to, as Collier and others suggest, little
more than a vast criminal syndicate overlaid with a patina of social
justice rhetoric?
III. Oil Nation: Nigeria’s “Perfect Storm”
The rise of Nigeria as a strategic player in the world of oil geopolitics
has been dramatic. It has occurred in the wake of a bloody civil war
that ended in 1970, in which several million people were killed. In the
late 1950s, petroleum products were trivial, amounting to less than
2% of total exports. Between 1960 and 1973, oil output exploded from
just over 5 million barrels to over 600 million barrels. Government oil
revenues, in turn, accelerated from N66 million in 1970 to more than
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N10 billion in 1980. Over the last two years, oil and gas revenues have
averaged roughly $50 billion and nominal GDP is in excess of $100 billion.47 A multi-billion dollar oil sector with a set of expectations driven
by the aura of “Black Gold” has proven to be little more than a nightmare.48 An El Dorado, Nigeria is not. To inventory the “achievements”
of Nigerian oil development is a salutary exercise: 85% of oil revenues
accrue to 1% of the population. Perhaps $100 billion of the $400 billion
in revenues has simply gone missing since 197049 (the anti-corruption chief, Nuhu Ribadu, claimed that in 2003, 70% of the country’s oil
wealth was stolen or wasted; by 2005, it was “only” 40%). Almost $130
billion in capital flight occurred between 1970 and 1996.50 Over the
period 1965–2004, the per capita income fell from $250 to $212; income
distribution deteriorated markedly over the same period. Between 1970
and 2000, the number of Nigerians subsisting on less than one dollar a
day grew from 36% to more than 70%, from 19 million to a staggering
90 million. According to the International Monetary Fund, oil “did not
seem to add to the standard of living” and “could have contributed to
a decline in the standard of living.”51 Over the last decade, GDP per
capita and life expectancy have both fallen, according to World Bank
estimates.52 Nigeria has become a model failure, a reference point for
other resource-dependent states. After the discovery of oil in Mongolia,
a leader pronounced, “we do not want to become another Nigeria.”53
What is on offer in the name of petro-development is the terrifying and catastrophic failure of secular nationalist development.54 It is
sometimes hard to grasp the full consequences and depth of such a
claim. From the vantage point of the Niger Delta—but no less from the
vast slum worlds of Kano or Lagos—development and oil wealth is a
cruel joke. The costs of oil are experienced, not only in class terms, but
equally importantly, geographically. The paradoxes, contradictions,
and traumatic costs of oil are nowhere greater than on the oil fields of
the Niger Delta where it has wrought only poverty, state violence, and
a dying ecosystem.55 The recent UNDP report on human development
in the delta was unflinching in its assessment: the “appalling development situation”56 reflects the uncontestable and shameful fact that after
a half century of oil development “the vast resources from an international industry have barely touched pervasive local poverty.”57 In 2003,
the government launched a joint military task force called Operation
Restore Hope, named ludicrously after the ruinous U.S. operations in
Somalia, to secure the delta. Yet government’s presence, Ike Okonta
notes, “is only felt in the form of the machine gun and jackboots.”58
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By conservative estimates, there have been over 7,000 oil spills since
1970. Gas flaring, while down by 40% from its historic high (80%),
still produces 70 million metric tons of carbon emissions (“a substantial proportion of worldwide greenhouse gas”59), amounting to a loss
of $2.5 billion annually in associated gas.60 According to the World
Wildlife Fund report released in 2006, the delta is one of the most polluted places on the face of the earth. A much-publicized Commission
of Nobel Laureates on Peace, Equity and Development in the Niger
Delta Region concluded that the “wealth earmarked for the region”
was “largely stolen by politicians.” The frustration and violence, they
concluded, was “rising…and getting worse.”61 It is all too easy to be
apocalyptic in tone—and to endorse a certain sort of catastrophism
that afflicts so much writing about the continent—but if truth be told,
Executive Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) Nuhu Ribadu was surely right when he observed that the
Niger Delta situation was “not being taken seriously” and might “end
up like…Somalia.”62 Or perhaps Colombia?
The heart of the Nigerian development failure is the politics of
unearned income.63 Its central dynamic is the fiscal sociology of access
to and distribution of oil rents.64 The Nigerian petro-state—a particular
form of state-formation driven by particular forms of rent—is comprised of several key institutional elements: (1) a statutory monopoly
over mineral exploitation (there are almost 50 acts and laws that constitute control over and regulate state control of petroleum and gas),
(2) a national (state) oil company (the Nigerian National Petroleum
Company, NNPC) that operates through joint ventures with oil majors,
which are granted territorial concessions (blocs) as Oil Prospecting
Licenses or Oil Mining Leases, (3) the security apparatuses of the state
(often working in a complementary fashion with the private security
forces of the companies) which ensure that costly (and vulnerable)
investments are secured, and (4) a political mechanism by which oil
revenues are distributed. In sharp contrast to the broad-based tax state,
the petro-state contains all manner of “pathologies” derived from oil.65
Examples include autonomy from citizens, external intervention, vulnerability to subversion, non-transparency, ineffective bureaucracy,
“coupism,” and so on.66 Within this nexus, the national oil company
stands as the blackest of black holes, or a dark star of theft, corruption,
and fictional accounts typically under the direct control of the President. State oil, said one commentator, “is like a party with the lights
out and the music on full blast.”
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The failure of the petro-state resides in the oil revenue distribution
question—whether in a federal system like Nigeria or in an autocratic
monarchy like Saudi Arabia—and is an indispensable part of understanding the combustible politics of the oil complex. Rentier-capitalism in Nigeria turns on four key distribution mechanisms.67 These are
the federal account (rents appropriated directly by the federal state);
a state derivation principle (the right of each state to a proportion of
the taxes that its inhabitants are assumed to have contributed to the
federal exchequer); the Federation Account (or States Joint Account),
which allocates revenue to the states on the basis of need, population,
and other criteria; and a Special Grants Account. The Special Grants
account includes monies designated directly for the Niger Delta, for
example through notoriously corrupt designated entities like the Oil
and Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission, founded
in 1993 and abandoned in the late 1990s; the Niger Delta Development Commission,68 founded in 2000; and the new (2006) Consolidated Council on Socio-Economic Development of the Coastal States
of Nigeria. The quantum of oil revenues around which these distributive mechanisms operate is, in turn, a product of the Memorandum of
Understanding associated with joint venture activities in which companies and the NNPC have equity. Since the 1970s, state equity has
been on the order of 55–60%. While the proportion of each barrel as
government “take” is directly related to oil price, the government portion per barrel (equity, taxes, rents, and royalties) is never less than
70%. Under current conditions it may be 90% or more.69
Over time, the relative weight of central versus direct state (regional)
control has shifted as a function the often-violent political struggles
among ethnic majorities that shaped the post-civil war development
of the federation (1967–1970). Since 1960, there has been a general
process of radical fiscal centralism, a process that simultaneously refers
to the extent to which the federal center controls revenues (through
what became in 1979 the federation account) and the degree to which
it retains revenues for federal use (increasingly under military rule
through “special accounts” outside of the federation account). There
was in effect a double movement in operation over the last forty years:
on the one side, the multiplication of states, all of which are largely
dependent upon central (oil) revenues; and on the other, a series of
statutory monopolies over mineral (including oil and gas) resources
and land (put in place between 1967 and 1978 and continued to date
through the 1999 constitution, or Decree No. 24, which was itself the
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retention of the 1979 constitution, adopted in the last hours of military rule prior to Obasanjo’s tenure70). The “evil twin” of the control
over resources was a state-centered revenue allocation process that by
definition vastly enhanced the power of the state.71 One expression of
this centralism is the extent to which the oil and gas sector has been
run, especially since the Babbangida period, as a personal fiefdom of
the Presidency. (President Obasanjo directly controlled the oil and gas
portfolio throughout his two terms.) A second is the fact that a series
of revenue allocation commissions have changed the metric of allocation such that the principle of derived income (states can command a
proportion of the revenue from resources within their territory) has
diminished while the oil revenue flowing to the federal account by
other distributional criteria has expanded dramatically.
The history of revenue allocation is far too complex to rehearse
here. Suffice it to say that the creation of new states in 1967, in the context of a secessional war and enormous ethno-regional enmity, raised
a panoply of political challenges.72 Among them were questions of
how monies from the central bourse (then named the Distributable
Pool Account, or DPA) were to be shared. How would the new states
share the assets of the regions from which they were created? How
would the fiscal demands of new administrative machineries be met?73
From the end of the Second World War, revenue allocation had been
handled in an ad hoc fashion through fiscal commissions that gave
a priority to derivation as a principle of allocation for mining rents,
coupled with shared regional revenues from the DPA. But between
1967 and 1979, the DPA was enlarged because mining and other rents
directed to it were increased and, conversely, the derivation principle
was de-emphasized. Over the period 1946–1979, the federal appropriation declined from roughly 82% of all government revenues in
1950 to roughly 60% during the 1960s, then subsequently grew to 81%
by 1979. In 1969, a set of principles was introduced for a simple system of revenue sharing among the states (including criteria such as
population and equality of states). In 1979, the Federation Account
was created into which virtually all revenues collected by government
were to be paid. A strict formula was established in 1982 (subsequently
amended in 1984 and 1992) for sharing revenues among the three tiers
(so-called vertical allocation): federal government (typically between
50% and 48%), states (varying between 30%–24%), and local governments (20%–15%). This system was endorsed in principle in 1999 at
the return to civilian rule even though several important changes had
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occurred in the political economy of revenue allocation during the
military period.74 First, the federal government had in practice proportionally increased its revenues through a number of special accounts
(the National Economic Recovery Fund, the National Priority Projects
Account, the Joint Ventures Cash Calls Payment Account, and so on);
the derivation principle had shrunk to roughly 1% by the mid-1980s
(from 50% in 1960); and the lower tiers of government had become
almost wholly dependent upon centrally allocated revenues (rather
than raising revenues themselves from state or local taxes). The share
of the states’ revenue averaged 22% between 1971 and 1978, and worsened cyclically thereafter (averaging 10% by the late 1990s). The combined share of state and LGA revenues fell by almost 60% between
1986 and 1996. In contrast, the federal government’s share grew from
67% to 86% over the same period.
Overall, the relationship between state and LGA multiplication and
centrally controlled oil wealth is quite clear. More and more political
entities depend upon the limited and changeable oil revenues; the
poorer the state or LGA, the greater the degree of dependence for
revenues upon the federation account. Oil revenues constituted the
vast proportion of all government revenues collected until the mid1990s. This dependency had a spatial expression in that oil-producing states experienced a net decline in the share of what previously
had been deemed as their (i.e., derived) resources. As a consequence
of the reconfiguration of revenues principles and distributional criteria, the oil-producing states (composed largely of so-called ethnic or
“oil minorities”) have lost and the non-oil-producing ethnic majorities have gained—by fair means or foul. By 1980, the non-oil-producing states accounted for over 75% of total federal allocations; between
1980 and 1990, the proportion of federal allocations to Rivers state, for
example, fell from 10% to less than 3%.75 The changed topography of
revenue allocation has its irregularities, however, and despite the clear
overall historical trend since 2000, there has been the beginning of an
important countermovement in the sense that the oil-producing states
have expanded their control (in theory and practice) over national oil
income through the derivation principle.76 In the past eight years, for
instance, the delta states have received $30 billion in oil income; the
2006 budgets for Rivers and Bayelsa states were respectively N168 and
N125 billion.77 The history, nevertheless, of postcolonial Nigeria is the
history of the reconfiguration of, and the Olympian struggles over,
revenue allocation.
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The complex politics of fiscal centralization—and decentralization—provides the ground upon which rest three important aspects of
what one might call the “new” Nigerian political economy. The first is
the decentralization of corruption associated with the vast increase in revenue flows in the delta in conjunction with the increase of derivation to
13% in 1999. In 2004, the four largest oil states received over two billion
dollars capable of being pillaged; nowhere is this more so than in the
wholly non-functional (and unaccountable) systems of local government which have grown in absolute terms quite dramatically.78
Second is the democratization of the means of violence. In other words,
the state monopoly on violent means of destruction has been undercut
by the widespread deployment of arms locally by militia and other
militants.79
And third is the rise (in part associated with changing revenue allocation) of enormous power and wealth at the level of the state governors.
They have become not only counterweights to the federal center but
machine politicians, the regional “Godfathers,” in their own right.
This trio of forces frame what is called the “resource control debate”
in the delta, a political movement with a deep history dating back at
least to the issues raised by the Willinck Commission on the “fears” of
the ethnic minorities in the delta during the 1950s.80 Propelled since the
1980s by youth and other ethnic movements—and subsequently captured by the southern political classes from the oil-producing states as
a means of providing political pressure on the revenue allocation process81—the minority fears of the 1950s became minority grievances in
the 1980s and minority militancy by the 1990s.82 Since 1999, Obasanjo
has endeavored to maintain a balancing act, weighing a growing Niger
Delta clamor for resource control backed by an insurgency against the
array of political forces rooted in the hegemony of powerful northern
and southern political interests. For example, the federal center has
increased derivation to 13%, though it drew a line in the sand in its
refusal to meet the delta delegation’s demands of 25% derivation or
more during the 2005 National Political Reform Conference.83 Obasanjo
has steadfastly refused to apologize for, or even acknowledge, the
unwarranted violence and human rights violations by federal forces
in the slaughter at Odi or Odioma,84 or acknowledge the casualties
inflicted by the joint military task force in and around Warri. Yet he
capitulated to Niger Delta demands over granting offshore littoral oil
fields as amenable to derivation (largely in an effort to purchase support for his failed attempt at a third Presidential term). In sum, a hegemonic deployment of force (militarization) and consent (purchasing
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compromise through oil revenues) has pockmarked the state’s struggle
to contain the resource control movement. I will take the Gramscian
argument one stage further. From the vantage point of the subaltern
classes for whom resource control has been the avatar of mobilization,
the struggle (the balance of force and consent) has gradually shifted
from a “war of position” (a discursive struggle to legitimate the call for
resource control) to a “war of movement” (insurgency).
It is indisputable that the oil boom since the late 1990s and the surge
of windfall oil profits as prices rose to $70 per barrel have inserted
a vast influx of monies into the delta via state and local government
structures. It is perfectly clear, however, that the actual disbursement
of monies and the flow of oil revenues from Abuja to the oil-producing states are marked by massive malfeasance and diversion. In 2006,
Rivers and Delta states, for example, received in excess of one billion
dollars in federal revenues; in the first six months of 2006, the 23 local
governments in Rivers state received more than $115 million in federal
allocations (including derivation). There is a sense, then, in which the
delta is awash in oil monies, notwithstanding the fact that nobody
believes that the full complement of statutory allocations are received
in their entirety by the oil-producing states85 (and here is a sharp contrast with, say, the mid-1980s, when derivation had plummeted to
1% on the back of the oil price collapse). When the Movement for the
Survival of the Ogoni People was founded in 1990, a plausible case
could be made that the oil-producing states and the local councils were
starved of oil revenues (the “politics of minority suffocation” was how
the Association of Minority Oil States put it in 1992). Fifteen years later,
this is a much harder case to make (writing in 2007, Human Rights
Watch referred to a “vast increase in financial resources” since 199986).
Overlaid upon the Nigerian petro-state and its fiscal sociology is,
in turn, a volatile mix of forces that give shape to the oil complex.87
First, the geo-strategic interest in oil means that military (foreign and
local, private and state) and other security forces are part of the local
oil complex. Second, local and global civil society enters into the oil
complex either through transnational advocacy groups concerned with
human rights and the transparency of the entire oil sector, or through
local social movements and NGOs fighting over the consequences
of the oil industry and the accountability of the petro-state. Third,
the transnational oil business—the majors, independents, indigenous
operators, national oil companies, and the vast service industry—is
actively involved in the process of local development through community development, corporate social responsibility, and “stakeholder
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inclusion.” Fourth, the inevitable struggle over oil wealth—who controls and owns it, who has rights over it, and how the wealth is to be
deployed and used—inserts a panoply of local political forces (ethnic
militias, paramilitaries, separatist movements, and so on) into the operations of the oil complex (the conditions in Colombia are a representative case). Fifth, multilateral development agencies (the IMF and the
IBRD) and financial corporations like the export credit agencies appear
as key “brokers” in the construction and expansion of the energy sectors in oil-producing states (and latterly, the multilaterals are pressured
to become the enforcers of transparency among governments and oil
companies). Not least, there is the relationship between oil and the
shady world of drugs, illicit wealth (oil theft, for example), mercenaries, and the black market economy. The oil complex is a vast enclave of
corporate, state, and military power88 of unimaginable robustness and
reach, at once shadowy, intimidating, secret, corrupt, and violent, and
now draped in the cloak of security, terror, and war.
It would be wrongheaded to see in the Caspian, in Colombia, or in
the Gulf of Guinea identical oil complexes at work. They differ obviously in their historical, cultural, and political specificities. Yet they do
all operate as enclaves of economic and political calculation, in essence
a form of “governmentality” or rule, characterized by enormous turbulence and wealth creation. In short, the oil complex looks very much
like an embattled zone of the most primitive accumulation.89 Empirically, the current operations of the oil complex have been radically
shaped by the forces of post-9/11 politics, the failure of postwar U.S. oil
policy, and the tightness of global oil markets.90 In the face of support
by neoconservative promoters and opportunistic Washington lobbyists, strategists at the Pentagon have invented a new security threat
to increase funding for European Command’s footprint in Africa.91
Recently, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs
Teresa Whelan announced the discovery of a “new threat paradigm”:
the threat of “ungoverned spaces” in Northwest and West Africa.92 In
practice, all four of the military services (including an Africa Clearinghouse on security information, supported by a Pentagon think
tank, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, housed at the National
Defense University) are now implicated in the new scramble for the
continent. Against a backdrop of spiraling militancy across the delta,
U.S. interests have met up with European strategic concerns with the
establishment of the “Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy.” By
December 2005, the American ambassador and the Managing Direc-
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tor of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation agreed “to establish four special committees to coordinate action against trafficking in
small arms in the Niger Delta, bolster maritime and coastal security
in the region, promote community development and poverty reduction, and combat money laundering and other financial crimes.”93 U.S.
military activity increased from almost none in 2004 to “104 ship days”
in 2006.94 The establishment of a new African command (AFRICOM)
in February 2007, and the appointment of its first head, William (Kip)
Ward, is the final capstone in the militarization of American energy
security policy in Africa.
Energy security, it turns out, is a terrifying hybrid, a perplexing
“doubleness,” containing the old and the new—primitive accumulation and American militarism coupled to the war on terror.95 Into this
vortex of forces descends a set of other global and imperial forces: on
the one side, the presence of aggressive Chinese (and other Asian) oil
companies and, on the other, the new imperial intentions of the South
African energy companies. Put into the mix the resurgence of Islamism
in Nigeria (and indeed across the Sahelian belt) and the political clout
of urban evangelical Christianity across the southern oil-producing
conurbations, and one has the makings of a “perfect storm” of instability, violence, and conflict.96
IV. The Niger Delta: An Ungovernable Space
It is a measure of a certain sort of notoriety when Nigerian politics
reaches the pages of Vanity Fair, penned no less by a prize-winning
journalist and writer who, to the best of my knowledge, knows nothing
of Africa or, in this case, the Niger Delta.97 Sebastian Unger’s account of
Ijaw militants operating in the oil-rich creeks of the Niger Delta is little
more than tabloid journalism, but the realities to which it speaks have
been an extraordinary combination of the theatrical and the incendiary,
worthy perhaps of any tabloid’s scrutiny. On 15 September 2005, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the Governor of Bayelsa State, which is a major
oil-producing state in the heart of the Ijaw homeland, was arrested by
British security agencies at a London airport (a trip purportedly made
to undertake cosmetic surgery) on three counts of money laundering
(to the tune of 1.8 million pounds). The Governor’s arrest—designed
to send a signal to unruly Governors everywhere in the run up to the
2007 elections and Obasanjo’s ultimately fruitless effort to run for a
third term—clearly involved close collaboration between the Obasanjo
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and Blair governments. Released on $1.25 million bail in early October,
Alamieyeseigha dramatically escaped from house detention in central
London (disguised as an old woman) and appeared rather magically
in the capital of Bayelsa, Yenagoa, on November 20 to adoring crowds
after, as far as we can tell, an extraordinary escape via Paris, Yaoundé,
and finally by small boat along the creeks by the Cameroon-Nigeria
border.98 On 9 December, amidst considerable political confusion, he
was seized by police in Government House after the state House of
Assembly had voted 17–24 to impeach him. All of this occurred under
the tight security presence of the Joint Task Force and the State Security Services (SSS).99
Shortly after the London arrest, on 21 September 2005, against a
backdrop of deepening militancy and oil-supply disruption and
undemocratic maneuvers by President Obasanjo to quite literally purchase the support of the senate for his third term ambitions, Alhaji
Asari-Dokubo, the charismatic and savvy leader of the Niger Delta
People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF)—an insurgent militia force fighting,
by its own account, for resource control and self-determination in the
eastern delta—was arrested by Federal forces on treason charges. Asari,
a forty-year-old son of a Calabar judge, former Ijaw Youth Congress
(IYC) President, and sometime political operative for the Governor
of Rivers State, was arrested by police in the Rivers State’s Governor’s
house in a sting operation and was taken to Abuja in spite of the fact
that ostensibly a peace settlement between some of the Niger Delta
militants and the government had been brokered in October 2004 by
Obasanjo himself.100 Asari has been held in Abuja in SSS custody and
appeared in February 2007 to stand trial amidst claims that his previous unruly behavior in court justified the decision to hold the proceeding with Dokubo in absentia. In something of a circus atmosphere,
Asari referred to the judge as an “idiot” and the eighty security agents
in the courtroom were unclear as to whether and how the accused was
to be removed from the courtroom.101
Finally, in what proved to be a trifecta of political crises for the Ijaw
community, the Central Bank reported to the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission on 6 October 2005 that the head of Allstate Trust
Bank and Ijaw capitalist, Chief Ebimiti Banigo, was guilty of corruption. He was subsequently arrested and the bank was consequently
closed, amidst the loss of substantial personal savings by many depositors in Rivers state. All of these events—in effect the arrest and detention of three major Ijaw notables—were inevitably read as a political

102

Michael Watts

attack by Obasanjo’s government on a region (the Niger Delta) and
people (the Ijaw) that had been at loggerheads with the federal center,
a hostility marked both by the collapse of the national CONFAB in
2005 on the allocation of oil revenues (in which the delta representatives led by Oronto Douglas walked out) and the militarization of the
delta under the auspices of two special military task forces (Operation
Restore Hope and Operation Flush Out) instructed to adopt a “shoot to
kill” policy as the oil fields descended into chaos.
Out of this vortex of events—one part soap opera, one part machine
politics—there emerged in late 2005, in a most dramatic fashion, a
hitherto unknown group of masked insurgents, the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), claiming to be a “union of
all relevant militant groups,”102 and whose public face is a shifting and
sometimes contentious cadre of leaders (and aliases), including MajorGeneral Godswill Tamuno, Tom Pollo, Oyinye Alaibe, Cynthia White,
and the eloquent spokesperson, Gbomo Jomo. After its massive attack
on the Opobo pipeline in Delta State in December 2005,103 MEND began
calling for the international community to evacuate from the Niger
Delta by 12 February or “face violent attacks.” In a fantastically audacious series of forays, MEND struck an oil vessel belonging to TIDEX
Nigeria on 11 January 2006, fifteen kilometers offshore. Four workers
were kidnapped (and reportedly released for a N120 million ransom),
shutting in over 100,000 bpd. On 15 January, thirteen members of the
Joint Task Force were killed during an attack on the Shell Benisede
flow station, and in late January an AGIP platform and its riverfront
Port Harcourt offices were attacked and eight policemen were killed.
On 18 January, an email promised “our operations will shift from the
creeks to the cities” and beginning 1 February 2006, there would be
“more aggressive tactics aimed at oil company workers.”104 Following
an earlier ultimatum and a promise to reduce Nigeria export capacity
by 30%, on 15 February, MEND declared a “state of emergency” and
the launch of Operation Black February to demonstrate “its rugged
guerilla wit and dogged intelligence in hunting down every foreign
foot.”105 Then, in the wake of a purported peace accord held in Yenagoa on 11 February, the joint task force embarked upon a vicious aerial
bombardment of Ijaw villages in Okerenkoko territory (the heartland
of the Gbaramantu clan), ostensibly to bomb oil bunkering barges. In
retaliation, on 18 February, MEND launched the most audacious and
coordinated of its attacks. Forty rebels overpowered guards and military on Willbros barge 318 (nine foreign hostages were taken) and sub-
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sequently destroyed the offshore Forcados crude loading platform, the
Ekeremore-Yeye manifold, and the NNPC Escravos-Lagos gas pipeline
in Chanomi Creek. In a single day, approximately 20% of output was
compromised.
The political agenda of MEND was not clear in the weeks of late
December 2005 except that it self identified as a “guerilla movement”
whose “decisions like its fighters are fluid.” In fact, in a press release
by email—this is the modality of their politically savvy, Subcommandante-Marcos-like exhortations and pronouncements—Jomo claimed
that MEND was “apolitical” in structures and fighters “were not communists…or revolutionaries. [They] are just very bitter men.”106 There
was, in fact, a clear political platform—in spite of a welter of email
denials calling an Oporoza-based Ijaw militant group, the Federated
Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), a “tribal assembly;” claiming to have “co-opted” the NDPVF; rejecting any connection with oil
bunkering; and asserting it is not “an Ijaw militia group.”107 In a signed
statement by field commander Tamuno Godswill in early February,
MEND’s demands were clearly outlined:
• Immediate and unconditional release of Alhaji Asari-Dokubo
• Immediate and unconditional release of Governor Alamieyeseigha
• Immediate and unconditional release of youth leader Joshua
Macaiva
• Immediate and unconditional demilitarization of the Niger delta
• Immediate payment of $1.5 billion compensation from Shell
approved by the Nigerian National Assembly covering four decades
of environmental degradation.108
In an interview with Karl Maier on 21 February 2006, Jomo made
it clear that MEND had “no intention of breaking up Nigeria” but
also had no intention of dealing directly with the government, which
“knows nothing about rights or justice.” Resource control meant that
the states would “directly manage” oil. Other communiqués reiterated that these demands were not pecuniary and “we shall receive no
money from any quarters.”109
Into 2006, MEND’s claim that it was capable of delivering a “crippling blow” to the oil industry was increasingly borne out. More than
fifteen Nigerian soldiers were killed between May and August 2006,
and there were at least three kidnappings per month in the first half
of 2006. (Typically, the hostages are all released following the pay104
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ment of substantial ransoms by the government, although it is unclear
whether these payments are being made to MEND).110 The escalation
of attacks (44 in 2006, 19 in the first three months of 2007), including electronically detonated car bombings, brazen attacks on government and military buildings, massive disruption of oil installations
deploying sophisticated military equipment, and the audacious kidnapping of workers of virtually every nationality (including Chinese
and South Koreans), sometimes from platforms 40–60 km offshore,
have confirmed the worst fears of the oil industry. In the deteriorating
environment, many oil companies have withdrawn personnel and cut
back production. By mid-2006, there was 500,000–600,000 barrels per
day deferment, meeting MEND’s earlier goal of a 30% shut-in. Julius
Berger, the largest construction company in the country, announced
its withdrawal from the Niger Delta and many other companies began
to withdraw personnel as oil workers were increasingly reticent to be
posted there (many of whom were holed up in Lagos hotels). President
Obasanjo bolstered the Joint Military Task Force in the Delta, but the
seeming ease with which MEND can operate (“we navigate the creeks
in pitch blackness,” crowed Jomo) and overcome local security forces
suggests that the MEND “freedom fighters” control the creeks uncontested.
The violence has continued and, indeed, deepened. In April 2006,
two car bombs—one at the Bori Military Camp in Port Harcourt, the
other in the midst of 200 oil tankers in Ekpan Delta State adjacent to
the Warri refinery111—were deployed as “warning blasts,” threatening more to come. According to the Centre for Strategic and international Studies, 123 expatriate hostages have been taken since January
2006 (until early March 2007) and there have been 42 attacks on oil
installations.112 Against a backdrop of escalating attacks on oil facilities
and a proliferation of kidnappings, the Joint Revolutionary Council
(apparently an umbrella group for insurgents) threatened a “Black
November” as an “all out attack on oil operating companies.”113 A
month earlier, MEND launched a brazen attack by 50 fighters on the
Central Police Station and State Criminal Investigation Department in
Port Harcourt, keeping the full combined force of the police and army
at bay for six hours, and successfully withdrawing to the creeks after
freeing one of their “commanders,” Saboma George, a former NDV
militant who broke with Ateke. As of the fall of 2008, the residence of
the new Vice- President-elect (the Governor of Bayelsa State) has been
bombed, Chevron has temporarily shut down operations, there was a
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massive pipeline explosion at Bomu, and a total of 900,000 barrels of
oil per day are currently shut in (30% of official production). It is quite
unclear, when located on this larger canvas, what Petroleum Minister
Edmund Daukoru could possibly have meant when he announced to
OPEC in February 2007 in Greece that, “the worst is over” and that, “it
is a very, very temporary thing.”114
The rise of MEND—and its complex and shifting relationship to
other insurgent groups, such as the Martyrs Brigade and the Coalition
for Military Action in the Niger Delta (COMA)—marks a watershed in
the turbulent history of the delta oil fields, but it arises on the back of
a long arc of deepening violence and protest across the oil fields, especially since the late 1990s. The periodization of this deepening conflict
is, however, far from clear.115 During the 1970s, communities aired
their grievances to oil companies and occasionally to government, typically in an uncoordinated way. In fact, Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni
(before he founded MOSOP) laid out these issues clearly as early as
1968, during the civil war! The first civic organizational flowering
around the oil question in the delta occurred in the mid-1980s (during
the Buhari “opening”), followed by a period of mass ethnic political
mobilization led by the Ogoni movement up to the mid-1990s, but also
the establishment of political groups like the Ijaw National Congress
(INC) and the Chicoco Movement in the 1990s. Women’s groups were
some of the foundational protestors, elevating the struggle in the mid1980s and 1990s (such as the 1984 Ogharefe and Ekpan uprisings, and
those by Ogoni and other groups in 1994 and 1995). They were especially prominent in the July 2002 protests, led by Itsekeri women near
Ugborodo (Escravos) and by Ijaw women from the Gbaramantu and
Egbema clans in the Dibi and Olero Creeks.116 Thereafter, a number of
ethnic and pan-ethnic youth movements, marked by the 1997 founding in Eleibiri of the Chicoco movement and, in 1998, the founding of
the IYC and the drafting of the Kaiama Declaration, signaled a new
phase of both tactics and deepening militancy. The period between
1998 and 2000 was especially turbulent across the entire delta as military forces responded violently and with impugnity. Warri went up in
flames in 1997 and 1999, strikes crippled the LNG plant at Bonny in
1999, sixty-four Shell staff were held hostage in Isokoland in 1998, a
pan-Eket group (Afigh Iwaad Ekid) closed Mobil operations in Akwa
Ibom State, while there were 114 line-breaks in the Port Harcourt-Warri
pipeline in two months in late 1999 and early 2000.117 By 2002–03, there
were a number of explicitly militant movements, usually referred to
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as militias. These include the Egbesu Boys of Africa, Federated Niger
Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), MOSIEND, and Niger Delta Volunteer Force.118 Some were military spin-offs from non-militant groups,
such as the IYC. Some operated by building explicit alliances and connections with multifarious cult and vigilante groups (some university
based) and drug-related urban gangs with a variety of both political
and criminal goals.119
The appearance of MEND marked a new phase in terms of strategic
capacity but also in the “franchise” character of the insurgency, linking to and speaking for a number of militias and rebels. Whether it is,
as Okonta suggests, not an organization but “an idea” is difficult to
assess.120 Certainly the MEND militias operate with ease in and around
Warri. The leadership appears, as Okonta says, articulate and politically savvy. But MEND emerged, and is inseparable from, a number
of local and regional issues, the most important of which are the longstanding antagonisms between the oil companies, especially Chevron
in the Gbaramantu and Egbema clan territories, and the struggle over
the creation of local government councils in Warri (itself a long festering inter-ethnic struggle) that broke open in 1997. MEND has, of course,
been framed by a wider and pan-ethnic struggle for resource control.
At the same time, strife was detonated, so to speak, by what Ijaw see
as a deepening assault on their aspirations, or what Oboko Bello calls
“being cut off from being a nation” under President Obasanjo. The
extraordinarily violent gunship and helicopter attacks on Okerenkoko
in February 2006 and the assault by the Joint Task Force on MEND in
the wake of a truce brokered between MEND and the government in
August of the same year were consistent with a much longer history
of state violence across the Warri axis. In this sense, Okonta is surely
right to say that MEND is “the violent child of the deliberate and long
running constriction of the public space in the Niger delta…Behind
the mask of MEND is a political subject forced to pick up an AK-47 to
restore his rights.”121
Whether or not it is an umbrella organization, a franchise, or an
“un-united hydra,”122 MEND emerges on the back of a long process
of mobilizing from below and of widening the social base. It has welcomed the institutional incorporation of various youth groups in complex and unstable networks. MEND, for example has allegedly made
an alliance with the Outlaws, a renegade group previously linked to
the Icelanders. It has made a shift from nonviolent protest and demonstrations to occupations, sabotage, vandalism, and outright organized
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armed assault, including, since 1998, the tactical use of kidnapping and
ransom. Running across this story is the deepening involvement of the
organized militias, since the late-1980s, in various economic “enterprises,” including oil bunkering (and refining), ransoms, extortion,
protection services, and the drug trade. To see oil theft or hostage-taking as either new or as evidence of a simple linear shift from grievance
to greed is not helpful, in part because one person’s greed is another’s
grievance and because inevitably this mix of forces—always open to
different definitions and meanings—always operates as part of a complex whole. In this sense, the oil insurgency in the Niger Delta is not
terribly different from any insurgency in the history of militant political struggles anywhere.
By any estimation, the costs of this oil insurgency are vast. A report
prepared for the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, published in
2003 and entitled Back from the Brink (before the latest insurgency took
off), painted a very gloomy “risk audit” for the Delta.123 NNPC estimated that between 1998 and 2003, there were 400 “vandalizations” on
company facilities each year (and 581 between January and September
2004); oil losses amounted to over $1 billion annually. Already by 2003,
oil supply had been compromised by 750,000 bpd as a result of attacks
on oil installations across the region. In April 2004, another wave of
violence erupted around oil installations (at the end of April, Shell
lost production of up to 370,000 barrels per day, largely in the western
delta), this time amidst the presence of armed insurgencies. Two socalled ethnic militias, led by Ateke Tom (Niger Delta Vigilante [NDV])
and Alhaji Asari Dokubo (NDPVF), each driven and partly funded by
oil monies and actively deployed (and paid) by high-ranking politicians as political thugs during elections in the Port Harcourt-OkrikaKalabari axis, have transformed the political landscape of the delta.
Within the first six months of 2006, there were nineteen attacks on foreign oil operations and more than $2.187 billion lost in oil revenues; the
Department of Petroleum Resources claims this figure represents 32%
of the revenue the country generated that year. The Nigerian government claims that between 1999 and 2005, oil losses amounted to $6.8
billion, but in November 2006, the managing director of Shell Nigeria
reported that the loss of revenues due to “unrest and violence” was $61
million per day (a shut-in of about 800,000 barrels per day), amounting
to a staggering $9 billion since January 2006. By the end of 2006, Minister for Petroleum Resources Edmund Daukoru claimed that the cost of
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the insurgency was N7.5 billion per day,124 amounting to a total loss of
$16 billion since 2005.125
The elections of April 2007 (even more fraudulent than the widely
condemned elections of 2003) and the emergence of an Ijaw politician,
Goodluck Jonathan, Governor of Bayelsa State, as the Vice Presidentelect, has done little to dampen the ire of the militants. Since 1 May
2007 (as of June 2007), forty-two foreign workers have been kidnapped
and four pipelines have been blown up.126 In spite of the one month
post-election truce called by MEND in early June, attacks and ransoms
have continued almost unabated (there were seven between June 1 and
June 23, 2007). As of August 2008, the violence is undiminished.
Ken Saro-Wiwa, the pipe-smoking writer equipped with the power
of the pen, has now been replaced by the figure of the masked militant
armed with the ubiquitous Kalashnikov, the “typewriter” of the illiterate. But even Saro-Wiwa’s gravest fears could not have anticipated the
calamitous descent into violence over the last decade, culminating in
the dramatic appearance of MEND. Within a year of their appearance,
MEND had, as they themselves predicted, shut-in over one-third of
Nigeria’s oil output. Writing in mid-2007, the International Herald Tribune captures vividly the brave new world ushered in by MEND:
Companies now confine employees to heavily fortified compounds,
allowing them to travel only by armored car or helicopter… . One company has outfitted bathrooms with steel bolts to turn them into ‘panic’
rooms, if needed. Another has coated the pylons of a giant oil-production
platform 130 kilometers, or 80 miles, offshore with waterproof grease to
prevent attackers from climbing the rig… . Some foreign operators have
abandoned oil fields or left the country altogether. ‘I can’t think of anything worse right now,’ said Larry Johnson, a former U.S. Army officer
who was recently hired to toughen security at a Nigerian site operated
by Eni, an Italian oil producer. ‘Even Angola during the civil war wasn’t
as bad.’127

By November 2007, oil revenues were down by 40%, and 900,000
bpd shut-in. Shell alone, the largest operator, accounting for almost
half of all oil output, had lost $10.6 billion since late 2005. Ken SaroWiwa’s desolate prediction in 1990 of a “coming war” had seemingly
come to pass.
The Niger Delta’s long festering crisis is nourished by a gigantic
reservoir of anger and dissent. The reality on the ground is a dizzying and bewildering array of militant groups, militias, and cults: the
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Niger Delta Militant Force Squad, the Niger Delta Strike Force, the
Grand Alliance, Niger Delta Coastal Guerillas, South-South Liberation
Movement, Movement for the Sovereign State of the Niger Delta, the
Meinbutus, the November 1895 Movement, ELIMOTU, the Arogbo
Freedom Fighters, Iduwini Volunteer Force, the Niger Delta People’s
Salvation Front, the Coalition for Militant Action, the Greenlanders,
Deebam, Bush Boys, KKK, Black Braziers, Icelanders, and a raft of other
so-called cults. Over fifty operating military camps are dotted around
the creeks. A large survey of Niger Delta oil communities by Professor
Aderoju Oyefusi, published in 2007, discovered that an astonishing
36.23% revealed a “willingness or propensity to take up arms against
the state.” The incontestable fact, as Ledum Mittee, the Ogoni human
rights campaigner, has noted, is that there is overwhelming popular
sympathy for what the militants are doing. Some sources estimate the
number of trained militants now operating in the creeks at more than
25,000, commanding monthly salaries of over N50,000 (well above the
wage that might be secured by an educated youth employed in the
formal sector). For their part, the oil companies have lost their license
to operate.
How did it all come to this?
V. Niger Delta Rebellion: Oil Insurgency or Organized Crime?
There have been a raft of new books on African oil in the last year.128
Written for the most part by journalists (and in one case by two military men), the books are replete with colorful stories of the devastating
intersection of frontier capitalism and the worst of African kleptocracies, neatly captured by such titles as “instant emirates,” “the Chinese
are coming,” and “wielding the oil weapon,” describing “some of the
most dangerous and dysfunctional nations on the planet.” None of
this work would have been possible without twenty years of critical academic research and excellent investigative work by the likes
of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Global Witness, and
Oxfam. Whatever one thinks of the “resource curse” literature129 (and I
think it comes close to a sort of commodity determinism), this body of
work exposes the pathologies of petro-states, the complex complicities
between Big Oil and African “oiligarchies,” and the disastrous consequences—environmental, political, and economic—of rentier political
economies driven by the logic of politicized distribution of oil revenues rather than systematic accumulation, or disciplined develop-
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ment, or the construction of transparent and accountable institutions
of governance. Over the decade, the resource curse, which for the most
part examined the political economy of oil dependency, has been taken
up by economists, some concerned with the relations between resource
dependency and poor economic performance (for example, Jeffrey
Sachs) and more recently with the politics of oil, not so much at the
level of corruption or fiscal mismanagement but rather sub-national
conflicts and the relations between oil, civil war, and rebellion. By
far and away the most ambitious and sophisticated research program
emerged from the World Bank and the leadership of Paul Collier, former member of International Socialist and the World Bank, now at
Oxford. His 2007 book, The Bottom Billion, turns resource dependency
into a field theory of poverty. Oil dependency, in this analysis, turns
on the relation between petroleum (not so much natural gas) and the
means by which rebellions and insurgencies are economically sustained and financed—and, by extension, the devastating costs for
development of long and protracted conflicts.130
This complex and variegated body of research131 might be dubbed
the “predation or rebellion as organized crime” theory of oil dependency. Collier’s clever theory focuses on the important question of
financing violent politics. It argues that oil provides a ground on
which rebels can finance rebellions (through looting the oil resources),
which are self-interested, criminal movements against the state. Collier’s “economics of war” argument (“rebellion is large scale predation
of productive activities”) draws upon a related and now large body
of work that explores the character of oil as a source of predation by
focusing on its point (as opposed to diffuse) character, its location (in
relation to state power), and the ease with which it can be looted. Different political outcomes can then be deduced from specific resource
attributes:132 warlordism (distant/diffuse), rebellion (proximate/diffuse),
coups (proximate/point), and secession (distant/point). Oil is captured
in the latter two cases (it is a point resource that varies in relation to
centers of power). Angola, Chechnya, Colombia, and Yemen are paradigmatic cases.
In a similar vein, Michael Ross explores the dynamics of oil politics
along two parallel axes: lootability (understood to be “easily appropriated [resource] by individuals or small groups of unskilled workers”133) and “obstructability” (the ease with which its movement or its
productive networks can be interrupted or blocked). Oil (on-shore and
offshore) is not lootable; it is, however, readily obstructable (pipelines
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can be detonated, flow stations occupied) on shore, but not offshore.134
He holds open the possibility that oil (as an unlootable resource) may
yield different types of outcomes (separatist in Cabinda, and non-separatist in Sudan), but believes that unlootability yields general associations. In other words, unlootability is likely to yield separatism (control
of the territory, not the wealth), benefits to government rather than the
poor, the reduced duration of conflicts, and enhanced army discipline.
Much could be said about Collier’s work in particular: its deep cynicism (“rebellion…is like organized crime”); its belief that motivations
in a conflict are unimportant (what matters is whether the organization can sustain itself financially); its assumption that history can be
reduced to rates of economic growth or the existence of prior civil conflict; its troubling problems associated with the nature of the data, evidence, and sampling; and its claim that insurgent predation is “worse”
than state extortion (or exaction).135 I shall focus on its foundational
claims and their capacity to provide a compelling account of the genesis of an oil insurgency across the Niger Delta. Their basic premises
are that greed is opposed to grievance, that peaceful protest stands in
opposition to rebellion, that government opposes rebellion, and that
rebellion equals organized crime. From these assumptions, Collier concluded in 2003 that the Niger Delta resembles an “American gangland”
involving a ferocious struggle over drugs. By 2007, he suggested it
was a vast “protection racket” run by young, unemployed, and poorly
educated criminals for whom life is cheap.136 At the same time, as Zinn
has noted, Nigeria seems to represent a striking exception to Collier’s
predictions.137 His model saw civil war as unlikely between 1965 and
1969 (when the Biafran war erupted), while on the other hand, the possibility for civil war was high between 1985 and 1999 (when there was
no such conflict).138 How, then, does the predation-lootability thesis
hold up?
The first criticism is that the very idea of an impermeable membrane separating or opposing two discrete entities—government and
rebels—breaks down immediately. Corporate actors are not present
in any serious conceptual way and the so-called militias, for example,
got their start by financial and weapons support from politicians in
the oil-producing states. The NDPVF was, as Oronto Douglas says,
“the creation of the Nigerian State.”139 It is widely understood that
former Federal Minister of Transportation Abiye Sekibo supported the
Okrika Vigilante (established in 1998) and its successor organization,
the NDV, led by Ateke.140 The decentralization of corruption, the rise
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of powerful gubernatorial machine politicians, and the enhanced statelevel influxes of petrodollars since 2000 all signal how porous is the
state/rebel divide. The NDV and the NDPVF members were deployed
as political thugs to deliver votes and intimidate voters in the notoriously corrupt and violent 2003 elections (although there were, of
course, militias and militant groups that pre-date 2003 and, indeed,
1999). Furthermore, a number of the arms used by the militias have
been acquired from the Nigerian military (directly in relationship to
electoral political thuggery and indirectly from a notoriously corrupt
and undisciplined army). Last but not least, the low-level oil theft
that is controlled by the rebels as a way of financing their struggle is
organized directly with the complicity of the security apparatuses, the
Niger Delta special military task forces, and the coast guard.141 The
Nigerian state, in its various institutional expressions, and the rebels
are both oppositional and organically self-sustaining. The head of the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Nuhu Ribadu, articulated the issue with great precision: the state is “not even corruption.
It is organized crime.”142 Ribadu’s views might confirm the criminal
aspects of the insurgency but this criminality is at odds with Collier’s
suggestion that predation operates outside of state criminality. If there
is organized crime, it seems to operate across the entire panoply of
institutions and organizations involved in the oil business.
In the same way, Collier’s (and Ross’s) claim that oil cannot be looted
stands in sharp contrast to the existence of a vast oil theft industry. This
is not the place to detail the dynamics of its structure (from low-level
bunkering territories policed by differing sorts of political actors up to
the syndicates, global in scope, that orchestrate a vast criminal industry), but an estimated 10% of U.S. imports are stolen.143 The point is that
oil is looted, and very effectively. At its peak in 2004–05, some 350,000
barrels per day were stolen, perhaps inserting $4–5 billion per year
into the financial system. While the criminal proceeds are unevenly
distributed along the commodity-chain (the low-level operatives gain
little in relation to the barge owners, shippers, military, and so on), the
fact is that both rebels and the political-security classes benefit from
it.144 There is no question that the oil bunkering trade embraces all
manner of agents motivated by all manner of desires (greed, grievance,
employment, excitement), but there is in principle no reason why organized crime (or extortion and sabotage, as the obstructability thesis
claims) and grievance cannot co-exist perfectly well. Theft by definition is a crime, but not all crime can be read simply as self-interested
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greed: “we are using our resources to fund this struggle,” as Asari
puts it. Indeed, this is the hybrid nature of insurgent politics. Equally,
even if the scale has waxed and waned, oil theft has a long history in
the delta, dating back to the 1970s, even if it was only recognized as a
serious problem in the late 1990s. In this sense, there has been no linear
shift, as Collier suggests, from grievance to greed.145
Many of these delta realities represent an empirical challenge to
conceptual claims about lootability. This structure of “predation” has
benefited a section of the military-political class, sustained all manner
of insurgents (and indirectly sections of the unemployed youth), further contributed to corruption and indiscipline within the military, and
contributed to a vast and complex field of violence. It encompasses,
as well, organized insurgents confronting the state, ethnic militias,
vigilante groups resembling the Mafia, anti-chieftainship conflicts,
inter-ethnic struggles, and criminal activities sometimes called cultism.
Needless to say, Ross’s very idea that offshore oil cannot be obstructed
has been shown to be spectacularly wrong. In the last few weeks, hostages were once again taken (and oil operations stopped) by MEND
from a platform 30 miles offshore. In fact, MEND’s charismatic communications chief, Jomo Gbomo, often refers to MEND’s abode as “200
miles offshore.”
A most striking aspect of these views of oil politics and civil conflict is that the agency of the oil companies—whether the national
oil companies or the supermajors with whom they operate or the oil
service/construction companies—has no analytical presence whatsoever in the models of rebellion or civil war. At most they appear as the
unfortunate corporate entities that are predated upon by rebels via
extortion, sabotage, and kidnapping. Corporate practice and agency
are conspicuously absent in any account of politics. This is astonishing
because the companies themselves have acknowledged that they are
a central part of the political dynamics of community conflict, most
obviously in the internal reports by Shell and Chevron widely leaked
in 2003 and 2004.146 This is not to suggest that corporations have deliberately instigated or encouraged rebellion. Rather, what passes as community development in the delta, and a company’s related interactions
with what are called “host communities,” are a central part of conflict
dynamics.147 It is estimated that Shell spends $60 million per year on
community development, yet cash payments amount to at least double
that figure. In total, these payments add up to perhaps $200 million per
annum, possibly 10% of the operating budget; some companies spend
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up to 15–17% on such activities.148 They represent a massive infusion
of cash designed to purchase consent or compliance.
In practice, however, they are central to the dynamics of rebellion
and community violence. One the one hand, companies are constitutionally obliged to pay rents to the local communities in which they
have operations. They have typically cut deals with local chiefs (many
of whom operate unaccountable fiefdoms), a number of whom are
not even resident in their communities. Community projects and
Memoranda of Understanding, to the extent that they exist at all, are
shrouded in secrecy and ambiguity. Corporate responsibility on the
ground often appears as a raft of unfinished community projects, all
of which have contributed to festering resentments among the youth.
Environmental Impact Assessments are rarely made public and the
record on spills and compensation is deplorable.
Last but not least, the policy of “cash payments”—used to pay for
protection services from local unemployed youth, to buy off local
opposition, and to feed a vast network of illicit payments—have had
the effect of generating enormously violent conflicts among youth
groups. Some of these payments are made to militias who have “security companies” of their own.149 Young men who are given standby
payments or hired as protection services inevitably engage in struggles
among themselves to capture or preserve the rents from competitors
(other youth groups). Or they threaten or depose corrupt local chiefs
(that is to say, they upend the system of gerontocratic rule at the village level) in order to gain access to the company rents and payments
that flow from oil operations in their territories. Corporate practice
and the struggle over oil rents to chiefs have contributed directly to
the longstanding inheritance and dynastic politics in kingdoms such
as Nembe, Bonny, Opobo, and Okrika, and more generally to what can
only be described as a crisis of chiefly rule across the oil fields. The fact
that so many chieftainships are ferociously contested and that, in some
cases, chiefs are thrown from office or publicly flogged by militant and
angry youth—surely unthinkable three decades ago—is a measure not
simply of the governance crisis of customary rule, but of the endemic
nature of the local conflicts and struggles that are key ingredients in
the rise of the larger militias, such as the NDV or FNDIC.
The challenge of the Niger Delta case to the resource-dependency/
predation thesis is four-fold. First, in its relatively brief petro-history, Nigeria has exhibited all four of the possible political outcomes
hypothesized by Le Billon and the predation thesis more generally:
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a coup d’état (beginning in 1966), secession (the Biafran War), rebellion (MEND), and warlordism (the militias). What do these multiple
outcomes suggest about the validity of the theory regarding predation,
location, and resource characteristics?
Second, the importance of commodity attributes, lootability most
obviously, seems undercut by the extent to which the purportedly
unlootable (oil as opposed to, say, diamonds) and the unobstructable
(offshore platforms and rigs) are clearly looted and obstructed.
Third, how does the predation thesis deal with an insurgency that
has been at least fifty years in the making? What must be explained
is the co-evolution of ethno-national and intergenerational shifts in
political power detonated by a recurrent history of state violence. It
confounds the simplistic generalizations that governments and rebels
and greed and grievance are easily separable. In practice, they are
indissoluble.
Finally, organized crime, which is, as Collier asserts, central to the
economics of insurrection, has an organizational structure and reach
that far exceeds the circumference of the rebels themselves and must
include, at the very least, state and corporate operatives. Embedded
within this claim is the larger issue of the nature and consequences of
corporate power for the predation thesis.
VI. Oil Rebels and the Bottom Billion
The insurgency across the Niger Delta, involving a welter of differing
groups and interests, is inextricably wrapped up with the intersection
of generational politics, a corrupt and violent petro-state, irresponsible
and short-sighted oil company practices, and the existence of a vast oil
bunkering network. As Kalyvas suggests, viewed from the micro-level
these sorts of insurgencies resemble “welters of complex struggles”
in which the notion that the rebels are criminals who operate against
law-abiding states fails to capture the true dynamics at work.150 Group
interests are often “localistic and region-specific,”151 yet, as I have tried
to argue, their specificity emerges from the structured totality of the
national and regional oil complex. It all makes for an enormously
unstable and volatile mix of economic, political, and social forces, now
located on a larger and more intimidating canvas of global oil instability and the Global War on Terror.
To return to Collier’s book and its claims about civil war and
resource traps, my purpose has not been to provide a full assessment
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of the “resource curse.” Collier’s approach has been “Large N” (crossnational) in orientation, rather than case study oriented, as my own
is here. At the very least, one can say that this body of research has
shown often contradictory results regarding the relations between
resources, growth, and conflict.152 It appears that only oil (among the
energy and non-energy resources) appears to offer a robust association
with the onset and duration of conflicts. This raises the question of the
specific qualities of oil (and gas?) that do not seem to hold for other
resources. But is the oil case quite as clear cut?153 Differing measures of
the resource itself—oil output versus oil reserves, or oil revenues as a
share of GDP, or oil rents—disclose rather different and contradictory
patterns and associations. Hence, De Soysa and Neumayer, by using
a particular measure of oil rents, find that the oil-conflict relationship
using the conventional measure of civil war (1,000 battle deaths) is
not met.154 The relationship seems to hold only for “low intensity”
(25 battle deaths) conflicts. Collier makes use of Oyefusi’s important
survey of Niger Delta communities155 to bolster his case but there are
all manner of inconsistencies here, too. Some of this turns on the data
itself: the oil variable consists only of the number of wells within a
community territory and nothing of their status (producing or nonproducing) or the quality and quantity of oil from local oil fields and
wells. More fundamentally, Oyefusi’s data seems to indicate (contra
Collier’s account of rebel recruitment and mobilization) that education,
ethnicity, and assets increase the likelihood of personal grievance as
a basis for rebel participation. Unemployment seems to be of no consequence as regards grievance level or rebel participation. All of this
makes for, as Michael Ross has admitted,156 a much more complex field
of causality. Resource wealth and political violence may co-vary, but it
may be that the obsession with resources mistakes a symptom, a state
failure, for a cause.157
My concern here has been to explore some of the claims predicated
on the analytical categories deployed in the name of the resources
curse: the sharp distinctions between states and rebels; the distinction between greed and grievance; the purported significance of point
versus non-point resources; and the lootability or nonlootability of
resources as a prerequisite for financing rebellion. I have chosen not
to question the existence of grievances as such, but to see under what
circumstances these grievances are incorporated into a rebellion. Such
conditions I interpret as an oil complex with its own characteristics
(enclave, corporate, militarized) and dynamics (oil theft, state-rebel
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collaboration). Here the Nigerian case, as singular as it is, highlights
issues that are passed over in Collier and related work.
Key to understanding the disorder and violence within which
opportunity structures are constituted are issues including the enclave
character of the economy, in which extremes of poverty and wealth
(and the environmental costs) are juxtaposed in close proximity; the
strategic significance of the resources in which corporate, foreign, governmental, and military powers form a center of economic and political
calculation; and the fact of state capacity and, hence, the pre-existing (pre-oil) political dynamics into which oil is inserted (rather than
“poor governance”). Not least, what is absolutely missing from these
analyses is the role and function of the transnational oil companies
themselves. In the literature, they only exist to the extent that they are
predated upon and/or are the source for extorting rents. The Nigerian
case shows otherwise. In this sense, the suspicion surrounding Big
Oil—as true in the U.S. as it is in Nigeria—assumes an important role
in the extent to which local grievances have “legs.” Corporate power
(yes, constrained by the powers of nationalist states) and their policies
of cash payments, community development, and unaccountable transactions with government and local communities alike, must be central
to any serious account of insurgency.
The picture that emerges from the Niger Delta is one in which the
oil insurgency—itself a complex amalgam of Clapham’s liberation,
separatist, reform, and warlord insurgencies158—is part of an economy
of violence. It resembles forms of social and class struggle (some criminalized, some not) within a historically and politically specific form of
primitive accumulation (or accumulation by dispossession as David
Harvey describes it159). Rather than poverty, economic stagnation, and
a lot of oil (Collier’s foundation stones), our starting point might be
a historical sense of class and socio-political exclusion, corporate and
other capital flows, and military neo-liberalism. To pose oil politics
in this way is doubtless unfashionable. It represents a language that
Collier by his own admission, on the first page of his book, ascribed to
in 1968 and then abandoned as he moved to his perch at Harvard, the
World Bank, and now Oxford. For all of its cleverness (and in my view,
its extraordinary cynicism), I am not sure that The Bottom Billion might
not have benefited from a dose of the revolutionary ardor that Paul Collier apparently subscribed to in the days when one could claim to be of
the Left without sounding silly or having to offer an apology. In any
case, Nigeria’s oil insurgency points to the multidimensional character
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of opportunity structures for mobilization from below. In this regard,
Nigeria’s case resembles that of Colombia, brilliantly documented by
Jenny Pearce, in which she concludes that while oil played a huge role
in the escalation of armed conflict through “opportunities for predation,” it was “policy failure, collusion of civil actors and terror and fear
in the absence of the rule of law that created the opportunity structure” for civil war and rebellion.160 These opportunities emerge from,
and are the products of, what Christopher Cramer calls the “double
helix of violent conflict,”161 one strand of which reflects the primitive
accumulation of the developing world while the other is the dynamics
and interests of the advanced capitalist states. This essay, elucidating
the oil complex and within it the petro-state, is my attempt to lay out
something of the structure of the political-economic DNA as it operates
through a particular economy of violence in the Niger Delta. 
•
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